Objective: The objective of this study was to consider the implications of a recent Western Australia Court of Appeal decision in which an indigenous youth who had been sentenced for the manslaughter of his neonate child was later diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder.
On the evening of 15 February 2014, observations of 25-day-old old Baby L by the nursing staff were unremarkable. After C left the appellant and Baby L alone in the hospital room for less than 10 minutes, the appellant struck Baby L's head at least twice against a hard surface causing skull fractures and severe brain injury. Three days later, Baby L died.
After his arrest, the appellant participated in two videorecorded interviews during which he said he had accidentally bumped Baby L's head on the wall or door frame.
The appellant's history
From age 6 years, the appellant had spent a substantial portion of his life in State care and was a ward of the State when he killed Baby L.
Describing the appellant's upbringing as 'completely dysfunctional', in a report to the court, a psychologist referred to a 'large, fragmented family system which has been characterised by domestic abuse, neglect, abandonment, disrupted attachment relationships, parental substance misuse and involvement in the criminal justice system'.
In 2004, when he was aged 6 years, the appellant and his siblings were placed in the care of the Department for Child Protection. In 2008, the appellant was returned to the care of his family. However, not long afterwards, his father died suddenly.
From age 11 years, the appellant began using alcohol and substances in the context of a family system in which substance abuse appeared to be normalised. In September 2010, when he was aged 12, the appellant was again taken into care. The relationship between the Department and the appellant's family was problematic and even during his care by the Department, the appellant did not have stable accommodation. When the appellant dropped out of school in grade 8, his literacy was poor.
The appellant's history of convictions included aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. In 2013, he was convicted of acts causing bodily harm after he was alleged to have thrown a knife at C and injured a bystander. At the time of Baby L's death, the appellant was subject to a nine-month conditional release order.
Trial and sentencing
After he was charged with murder, the appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was convicted on 23 February 2015. All the pre-sentence reports remarked upon the appellant's highly dysfunctional background, but did not refer to any mental impairment.
A child and adolescent psychiatrist opined that that there was no evidence of a major, or even transient, mental health disorder that could explain the appellant's violent behaviour. The psychiatrist concluded that the appellant exhibited only antisocial behaviours which were consistent with the diagnosis of 'conduct disorder, childhood onset'. The psychiatrist opined that the appellant did not require further psychiatric assessment and treatment, although she recommended 'psychological intervention'.
Based primarily upon his assessment of the interview with the police, the sentencing judge found that the appellant was only minimally remorseful for what he had done. The sentencing judge acknowledged that the appellant's ability to express his remorse was limited by his immaturity and the fact that he had been normalised to aggression and violence. Taking into account that the appellant was 'a product and a victim of a dysfunctional environment', the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 10 years.
The appeal
After the appellant had been sentenced, a team from the Telethon Kids Institute (an Australian medical research institute established in 1990 by Professor Fiona Stanley which focuses on the prevention of paediatric disease and the development of improved treatments for children) diagnosed Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD).
On appeal, the appellant argued that the FASD was a mitigating factor which was unknown to the sentencing judge. WASCA 164 allowed the appeal and sentenced the appellant to seven years' detention. The Court of Appeal cited an earlier Victorian appellate court decision which summarised the principles by which a mental or psychological condition falling short of insanity may be relevant to sentencing (Table 1) .
Decision of the Court of Appeal
In LCM's case, the Court of Appeal listed the various ways in which impaired mental functioning has been held to be capable of 'reducing moral culpability' ( Table 2) .
Referring to the decision in AH v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 228 in which, only 18 months earlier, attention had been drawn to the surprising lack of any FASD assessment of the appellant in that case, the Chief Justice (Martin CJ) found that the facts in LCM -vState of Western Australia suggested that 'the arrangements for the assessment and management of offenders suffering from FASD in this State remain quite inadequate'.
The Chief Justice held that the evidence clearly established that one of the reasons LCM was taken into the care and protection of the State in early childhood was the recorded history of alcohol abuse by his mother. In that context, the Chief Justice emphasised that when LCM manifested behavioural and intellectual difficulties as a young child, it was remarkable that those responsible for his care and protection did not initiate an assessment to exclude FASD. • The moral culpability of the offence, as distinct from the person's legal responsibility; • The person's condition may have a bearing on the kind of sentence that is imposed and the conditions in which it should be served; • A person suffering from serious psychiatric illness is not an appropriate vehicle for general deterrence, whether or not the illness played a part in the commission of the offence; • Specific deterrence may be more difficult to achieve and is often not worth pursuing;
• The mental or psychological condition may mean that a given sentence will weigh more heavily on the person than it would on a person in normal mental health. • Impair the offender's ability to exercise appropriate judgment; • Impair the offender's ability to make calm and rational choices, or to think clearly; • Make the offender disinhibited; • Impair the offender's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct; • Obscure the intent to commit the offence; • Contribute (causally) to the commission of the offence.
The Chief Justice held (at [5]):
'Nor do the arrangements for the assessment and management of FASD in the criminal justice system appear any better than in the child protection system, despite the publication last year to justice system professionals of a series of informative videos on the subject produced by the Telethon Kids Institute. When LCM was charged with the most serious offence known to the criminal law, namely murder, in a context in which the death was caused by unusual and unexplained circumstances, it is equally remarkable that neither the experienced defence counsel who represented LCM at first instance, or the author of the pre-sentence report, or the author of the psychiatric report, or the author of the psychological report, or the court identified the fairly obvious prospect that LCM might be affected by FASD, or initiated an assessment to ascertain whether or not he was, in fact, suffering from that condition. It should also be noted that the Community Development and Justice Standing Committee of the Legislative Assembly of Western Australia enquired into and reported upon the circumstances of this case 1 without making any reference to the prospect that LCM might suffer from FASD, or should at least be assessed for that condition. The fact of LCM's FASD only came to light coincidentally because LCM had been sentenced to a term of detention when the programme for screening for FASD undertaken by the Telethon Kids Institute was underway in that detention centre.'
The Chief Justice highlighted that the inadequacy of the assessment of FASD made it impossible to make any meaningful estimation of the extent to which FASD was suffered by offenders in Western Australia. The Chief Justice intoned that unless those arrangements improved, not only would injustice be visited upon those who offended at least in part because of a condition which they suffered through no fault of their own, but also the opportunity to reduce the risk to the community would be lost.
The Chief Justice noted that the significance of an offender's diagnosis of FASD has received far greater attention and consideration over a longer period in Canada than in Australia.
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder
In 1973, the term Fetal Alcohol Syndrome was first used to describe the characteristic facial anomalies and poor prenatal and/or postnatal growth and subsequent developmental and learning problems exhibited by children of 'alcoholic' mothers. 2 After it was recognised that alcohol exposure in utero may result in a constellation of neuro-developmental problems in the absence of facial and other physical features, the term Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) was introduced. 3 Emphasising that alcohol is teratogenic and that no level of maternal consumption is 'safe' for the developing foetus, the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia currently advises that the safest option for women who are pregnant or planning a pregnancy is to avoid alcohol. 4 Describing FASD as a 'hidden harm', the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs in 2012 found that FASD was under-recognised and often went undiagnosed. 5 Medical and allied health care professionals may also be reluctant to make a diagnosis of FASD for fear of stigmatising the family. 6 Three key issues appear to inhibit the ready diagnosis of FASD:
• • Changes in the FASD phenotype over the lifespan;
• • Inadequate documentation of pre-natal alcohol exposure;
• • High rates of post-natal adversity which increase complexity of diagnosis. 7 There is a disproportionate prevalence of FASD within youth justice systems. 8 Young persons with FASD are greatly disadvantaged at all stages of the criminal justice system 9 and most particularly in the sentencing stage. 10 Youths with FASD in Canada are 19 times more likely to be incarcerated than youths without FASD. 11 After the Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder Research Network of Canada published guidelines for diagnosis in 2015, 12 the Australian guide to the diagnosis of fetal alcohol spectrum disorder was promulgated in 2016 (Table 3) . To attract a diagnosis of FASD, the subject must have prenatal alcohol exposure and severe neuro-developmental impairment in at least three of 10 specified domains of central nervous system structure or function. Within FASD, there are two sub-categories: FASD in which the three sentinel facial features are demonstrated (similar to the previous 'Fetal Alcohol Syndrome') and FASD in which less than three of the sentinel facial features are demonstrated (similar to the previous 'Partial Fetal Alcohol Syndrome' and 'Neuro-developmental DisorderAlcohol Exposed').
Better understanding of the diagnosis of FASD is crucial to improving outcomes for those affected and to inform pre-pregnancy counselling. The Australian guide should enable clinicians to not only document (Table 4) , diagnose and manage FASD, but also counsel and support families to prevent FASD.
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